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Regulating Robo Advice Across the
Financial Services Industry
Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert*
ABSTRACT: Automated financial product advisors—“robo advisors”—are
emerging across the financial services industry, helping consumers choose
investments, banking products, and insurance policies. Robo advisors have
the potential to lower the cost and increase the quality and transparency of
financial advice for consumers. But they also pose significant new challenges
for regulators who are accustomed to assessing human intermediaries. A welldesigned robo advisor will be honest and competent, and it will recommend
only suitable products. Because humans design and implement robo advisors,
however, honesty, competence, and suitability cannot simply be assumed.
Moreover, robo advisors pose new scale risks that are different in kind from
the risks involved in assessing the conduct of thousands of individual actors.
This Essay identifies the core components of robo advisors, key questions that
regulators need to be able to answer about them, and the capacities that
regulators need to develop in order to answer those questions. The benefits to
developing these capacities almost certainly exceed the costs, because the same
returns to scale that make an automated advisor so cost-effective lead to
similar returns to scale in assessing the quality of automated advisors.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The growth of investment robo advisors, web-based insurance exchanges,
online credit comparison sites, and automated personal financial
management services creates significant opportunities and risks that
regulators across the financial services spectrum have yet to systematically
assess, let alone address. Because of the scale that automation makes possible,
these services have the potential to provide higher quality and more
transparent financial advice to more people at lower cost than human
financial advisors.1 However, this potential hardly guarantees that it will be
realized.

1. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FINANCIAL ADVICE MARKET REVIEW 39 (2016),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/famr-final-report.pdf (encouraging U.K. financial
services regulators to take steps to promote the development of automated financial advice to
increase access to financial advice); infra Part III (discussing the cost-effective structure and
components of robo advisors and the unique challenges regulators face); cf. FIN. INDUS.
REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE 8–9 (2016), http://www.finra.org/
sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf [hereinafter FINRA] (listing many good
governance practices for FINRA members to employ in relation to digital investment advisors, all or
most of which could also form the basis for external evaluation). See generally Abhijeet Sinha, White
Paper: Increasing the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Financial Advice with Robo-Advisors, INFOSYS (2016),
https://www.infosys.com/industries/financial-services/
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Indeed, the emergence of robo advice does not dispense with the role
people play in the industry. People design, model, program, implement, and
market these automated advisors, and many automated advisors operate
behind the scenes, assisting people who interact with clients and customers.
The history of people taking advantage of consumers in the financial services
industry is not a pretty one.2 Setting aside fraud and other unsavory activities,
the riches to be won by disrupting the financial services industry provide more
than enough incentive to rush technology to market. 3 In addition, there are
concerns that automation may entrench historical unfairness4 and promote a
financial services monoculture with new kinds of unfairness and a greater
vulnerability to catastrophic failure than the less coordinated actions of
humans working without automated advice.5
The challenges automated advice pose to regulators seeking to preserve
the integrity of financial markets do not stop there. There are well-known
privacy and security challenges that accompany the digitization of personal
financial data,6 and new regulatory challenges that are more specific to
white-papers/Documents/trend-financial-advisors-industry.pdf (demonstrating that investors can
gain advice from robo advisors at much cheaper costs than the fees charged by human advisors).
2. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Robert S. Stillman, The Law and Economics of Vanishing Premium
Life Insurance, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 1–3 (1997) (describing the vanishing premium scandal in the life
insurance industry in the early 1990s); Neil Fligstein & Alexander F. Roehrkasse, The Causes of Fraud in
the Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2009: Evidence from the Mortgage-Backed Securities Industry, 81 AM. SOC. REV.
617, 617 (2016); Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening Accounts, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-finedfor-years-of-harm-to-customers.html; Matthias Rieker, Broker Ordered to Pay More Than $1 Million in
Churning Case, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2014, 4:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/broker-ordered-topay-more-than-1-million-in-churning-case-1413231863.
3. See Thomas Philippon, The FinTech Opportunity 14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 22476, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22476.pdf (discussing
disruptive innovations of Fintech startups).
4. See, e.g., WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT
FROM WRONG 55–56 (2009) (advocating to ensure that autonomous artificial agents are created with
morality); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 677
(2016) (describing discriminatory effects of data mining); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 637–38 (2017) (noting the challenges algorithms pose for procedural
regularity); Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guy-problem.html
(“Sexism, racism and other forms of discrimination are being built into the machine-learning
algorithms that underlie the technology behind many ‘intelligent’ systems . . . .”).
5. See generally, CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016) (outlining dangers of relying on data analytics);
Dario Amodei et al., Concrete Problems in AI Safety (July 25, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.06565v2.pdf (discussing “accident risk” that may emerge from the
poor design of the real-world AI systems). For an effort by the tech industry to address some of these
challenges, see PARTNERSHIP ON AI, https://www.partnershiponai.org (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
6. See, e.g., Rick Swedloff, Risk Classification’s Big Data (R)evolution, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 339,
339 (2014) (noting that “big data raises novel privacy concerns”); Press Release, N.Y. State Dep’t
of Fin. Servs., Governor Cuomo Announces Proposal of First-in-the-Nation Cybersecurity
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automated advice. These include developing the capacities to assess: the
algorithms and data incorporated in the automated advisors; choice
architecture through which the advice is presented and acted upon;
underlying information technology infrastructures; and downside risk from
the scale that automation makes possible. Developing these capacities will
require financial service authorities—the paradigmatic expert administrative
agencies—to invest in new kinds of expertise. Our research and experience
suggests that the areas of expertise needed include data science, computer
science, behavioral economics, and psychology, to name just a few.7
The benefits to developing these capacities almost certainly exceed the
costs because the same returns to scale that make an automated advisor costeffective lead to similar returns to scale in assessing the quality of automated
advisors. An expert administrative agency is well situated to realize those
returns to scale. Moreover, the potential solvency and systemic risks posed by
hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of consumers choosing their
financial products based on the same or similar models are sufficiently large
and different in kind from those traditionally posed by consumer financial
product intermediaries that some regulatory attention is justified on those
grounds alone.8
At the same time, however, it is important not to overreact by setting a
higher bar for automated advisors than for human advisors. For now, the
standard against which automated advisors should be compared is that of
humans, whom we know are much less than perfect.9 Although a large body
of research in diverse fields demonstrates that even simple algorithms
regularly outperform humans in the kinds of tasks that robo advisors
perform,10 and, thus, it may be appropriate to hold automated advisors to a

Regulation to Protect Consumers and Financial Institutions (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.dfs.
ny.gov/about/press/pr1609131.htm.
7. See, e.g., Benedict G.C. Dellaert & Gerald Häubl, Searching in Choice Mode: Consumer
Decision Processes in Product Search with Recommendations, 49 J. MARKETING RES. 277, 285–86 (2012);
Eric J. Johnson et al., Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The Value of Choice Architecture,
8 PLOS ONE 1, 2 (2013) (studying impact of variations in choice architecture on health
insurance choice); Benedict Dellaert et al., Sorted Partitioned Sets as Personalized Choice
Architecture, (unpublished paper) (on file with author).
8. See infra Part III.
9. For a summary of research regarding the imperfections of human advisors see
Philippon, supra note 3, at 18.
10. See, e.g., Berkeley J. Dietvorst et al., Algorithm Aversion: People Erroneously Avoid Algorithms After
Seeing Them Err, 144 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 114, 118 (2014) (showing that algorithms
outperform human forecasters in future predictions); William M. Grove et al., Clinical Versus
Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-Analysis, 12 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 19, 25 (2000) (noting that
mechanical prediction is as accurate or more accurate than the clinical prediction); William M.
Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal
(Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical–Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB.
POL’Y, & L. 293, 299–315 (responding to commonly heard objections to algorithmic procedures).
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super-human standard someday, their market share is too small and regulators
have too much to learn to do so today.11
Our goal in this Essay is to open a discussion within legal and financial
services scholarship that invites the participation of those with expertise in
other relevant disciplines. As automated advisors grow in scale, protecting the
integrity of financial markets will require the kind of cross-disciplinary
cooperation that regularly occurs in the domains of health and environmental
regulation. The lawyers, economists, and behavioral scientists already involved
in financial services regulation will need to understand enough about
computer and data science to craft and apply new regulatory strategies, and
the computer and data scientists at the forefront of the innovation will need
to understand enough about legal structures and ways of thinking to help
make the new regulatory strategies sensible.
This assessment is a pressing need for the financial services authorities,
and it also presents an opportunity to explore the challenges and
opportunities that automated advice presents more broadly.12 This
opportunity arises from the substantial legal, economic, and historical
authority that financial services regulators already have to guide their actions,
along with an array of regulatory tools to employ.13 Thus, automated
consumer financial product advice provides a good case study as automation
extends into consumer markets. Though not everything we learn from this
case study will apply in other contexts, such as automated advice about cars,
homes, and vacations, there are similar opportunities to take advantage of
consumers in these and other markets for complex goods and services. Thus,
consumer protection techniques that work for financial products are worth
considering in other contexts.
In the body of this Essay we first identify the aspects of current financial
services regulation that apply most directly to robo advice: the regulation of
intermediaries such as securities brokers, insurance agents, and mortgage
brokers.14 We set out the traditional goals of that regulation: promoting
competence (to provide appropriate advice and associated services), honesty (of
that advice and associated services), and suitability (of the financial products

11. The estimated size of the retirement market in the U.S. is $25 trillion. INV. CO. INST.,
INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 124 (2015), https://www.ici.org/pdf/2015_factbook.pdf. By
comparison, as of Q1 2017, the total assets under investment of the six largest robo advisors ranged
from a high of $60 billion (Vanguard Personal Advisor) to a low of $1 billion (Future Advisor, which
is owned by BlackRock). See Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advisors: Old Policy Goals,
New Challenges, WHARTON PUB. POL’Y ISSUE INITIATIVE, July 2017, at 1–2.
12. See, e.g., WALLACH & ALLEN, supra note 4, at 55–56; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 677;
Kroll et al., supra note 4, at 657 (noting the challenges algorithms pose for procedural regularity).
13. See generally MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY (Robert
C. Clark et al. eds., 2016) (exploring law and policy in financial regulation).
14. See infra Part II.A.
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sold to, or recommended for, the specific consumer).15 We then explain why
any well-designed robo advisor should meet those goals at least as well as a
typical human advisor, most likely better, with the emphasis appropriately
placed on the caveat, “well designed.” At the same time, however, robo advice
raises new challenges for regulators, most immediately to develop the
expertise to assess whether robo advisors in fact are well designed.
In beginning with these traditional goals, we have two objectives: first, to
review why robo advisors are at least potentially superior to unassisted humans on
these dimensions for most consumers; and, second, to create a conceptual link
between existing regulatory goals and the new regulatory concerns. That
conceptual link supports regulators’ efforts to proceed under their existing legal
authority to develop the capacities they need to address these new concerns,
recognizing that they will need to operationalize this authority in new ways.16
We then identify the core technical components of robo advisors that
regulators need to understand and develop procedures to assess, including
the algorithms and processes that generate personalized rankings of financial
products for consumers; the consumer and financial product data that the
algorithms ingest; the choice architecture through which that advice is
delivered; and the associated information technology infrastructure. Focusing
on these core components is the first stage of a regulatory trajectory that
regulators can follow as robo advisors develop in sophistication and scale.
This analysis is conceptual and not specific to any specific governmental
agency, private regulatory organization, or ex post liability regime, nor is it
specific to any sector of the financial services market. At a conceptual level,
the analysis applies to most, if not all, consumer financial products and to
regulators of these products. Accordingly, we advocate an inter-governmental,
inter-agency dialog, with experts from inside and outside the financial services
15. See infra Part II.B. Note that this description of the three goals is a conceptual one that
does not map perfectly on the diversity of financial services regulations. Cf. Howell E. Jackson,
The Trilateral Dilemma in Financial Regulation, in OVERCOMING THE SAVING SLUMP: HOW TO
INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND SAVING PROGRAMS 82, 100
(Annamaria Lusardi ed., 2008) (“Generalizations are tricky given the range of legal regimes.”).
16. See, e.g., Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Harvard Law
School’s Fidelity Guest Lecture Series: Surfing the Wave: Technology, Innovation, and Competition
(Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/stein-2015-remarks-harvard-law-school.html.
The Commission is now challenged with thinking through what it means to regulate
a robo advisor. This concept did not even exist when most of the laws applicable to
investment advisers were drafted. Most of these laws are based on the idea of a
human investment adviser on the other end of the phone or sitting across the table
from you. . . . Clearly, if we want our markets to remain at the top, we need to
embrace innovation. And FinTech clearly promises some exciting advances. But, we
also need to be prepared to anticipate and ideally prevent problems before they
arise. Remaining competitive requires both market participants and regulators to
thoughtfully evolve with innovation, not react to it way after the fact.
Id.
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industry sharing information, identifying ways to make the necessary human
capital available to regulators, and developing an approach to regulating robo
advisors that increases the likelihood that they are honest and competent.
Some agencies have taken steps to learn about robo advice as part of their
larger efforts to engage with Financial Technology, or “FinTech,” but to date
they have done so largely within their own regulatory silos and within their
own countries.17 There is no formal inter-agency coordination in the United
States, and international coordination is even less developed.18 While there is
no evidence that this lack of oversight and coordination has caused harm yet,
it almost certainly will in the future, as the market simply cannot be counted
upon to be self-correcting when robo advisors grow in scale to the point that
they reshape financial product markets.19
In concluding, we explore steps that authorities might take beyond
demanding a minimum level of competence and honesty. These include
provisional ideas about how financial services regulation could facilitate
quality-based competition and diversity among robo advisors to ensure the
performance of intermediaries who use robo advisors increasingly exceeds
that of their unassisted competitors. In addition, as regulators gain
confidence in their capacity to assess and monitor robo advisors, and as robo
advisors become a major force in the market, there may be less need for direct
regulation of the forms and features of consumer financial products. Of
course, these regulatory benefits will not occur automatically. As any robo
advisor entrepreneur can attest, innovation requires understanding,
assessment, coordination, and feedback.
II.

ROBO ADVISORS AND FINANCIAL PRODUCT INTERMEDIARY REGULATION

In the popular press, a “robo advisor” is an automated investment service,
most likely based in San Francisco, which competes with financial advisors by
claiming to offer equally good, if not better, financial advice and service at a

17. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF INV. MGMT., GUIDANCE UPDATE: NO.
2017–02 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2017-02.pdf; see also FINRA, supra
note 1, at 3 (discussing governance and supervision of such advice). See generally Ryan VanGrack et al.,
Senior Advisor, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, FinTech Forum: The Evolving Financial Marketplace (Nov.
14, 2016, 9:02 AM), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fintech/transcript-111416.pdf (discussing the
opportunities and challenges of robo advice). We note that the SEC forum included a state government
official from Vermont. Id. at 76.
18. The U.S. CFPB has been closely following the “Project Innovate” of the U.K. FCA, but
to our knowledge, there have not been systematic efforts to share information in both directions.
19. While we cannot prove this point, a suggestive example comes from the impact of
structured financial products during the financial crisis. See generally Joshua Coval et al., The
Economics of Structured Finance, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2009) (exploring the role of structured
finance activities in the financial crisis).
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lower price.20 We use the terms “robo advice” and “robo advisor” more broadly
to include the similar services emerging in other sectors of the financial
services industry, most significantly in insurance, but also in consumer
credit.21 Using these terms so broadly emphasizes the similarities of these
automated advisors across the financial services spectrum and supports the
claim that regulators from the securities, banking, and insurance sectors need
to work together to assess them. The investment-focused robo advisors have
drawn the most attention from regulators,22 but the promises and regulatory
concerns raised by investment robo advisors apply equally to their insurance
and banking counterparts.23
Accordingly, we use the term “robo advisor” broadly to refer to any
automated service that ranks, or matches consumers to, financial products on
a personalized basis.24 Typically, the firms that provide these tools to
consumers also sell the recommended financial products, but advertising
funded “lead generation” services also can provide them.25 The consumer

20. See Rob Berger, 7 Robo Advisors That Make Investing Effortless, FORBES: INVESTING (Feb. 5, 2015,
10:28 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertberger/2015/02/05/7-robo-advisors-that-makeinvesting-effortless (discussing several popular robo advisors and their key features); see also Arielle
O’Shea, Best Robo-Advisors: 2017 Top Picks, NERDWALLET (June 23, 2017), https://www.nerdwallet.
com/blog/investing/best-robo-advisors (defining a robo-advisor and describing its features).
21. Insurance robo advisors include Healthcare.gov (health insurance) and CoverHound.com
(auto and homeowners insurance). While we have not found any true robo advisors in the banking
context, Zillow’s mortgage comparison tools and NerdWallet’s credit card comparison tools are a step
in that direction.
22. See, e.g., BLACKROCK, DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE: ROBO ADVISORS COME OF AGE 1 (2016),
http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-lm/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-digital-investmentadvice-september-2016.pdf; FINRA, supra note 1, at 1; MASS. SEC. DIV., POLICY STATEMENT: ROBOADVISERS AND STATE INVESTMENT ADVISER REGISTRATION 4 (2016), http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/
sctpdf/Policy-Statement--Robo-Advisers-and-State-Investment-Adviser-Registration.pdf.
23. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PROCESSES AND GUIDELINES FOR BECOMING
A WEB-BROKER IN THE FEDERALLY-FACILITATED MARKETPLACE 7 (2015), https://www.cms.
gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Marketplaces/Downloads/AB-Task-23-DraftWeb-broker-101-Webinar-Slide-Deck-09-30-15.pdf; Memorandum from the Ctr. for Consumer Info.
& Ins. Oversight 1 (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/HealthInsurance-Marketplaces/Downloads/Role-of-ABs-in-Marketplace-1_6_16.pdf.
24. Although it is more traditional in the legal literature to refer to mutual fund shares,
bank accounts, and insurance policies as financial services, rather than products, people in the
industry use the term “product,” and related terms like manufacturer, distributor, retailer, and
designer, because those terms allow for more precise description and analysis than the broader
and conceptually vague term “financial service.” See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, US FUND DISTRIBUTION
2014: SEA OF CHANGE ON THE HORIZON 3 (2014) (referring to manufacturers and distributors of
mutual funds), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-the-state-of-us-fund-distribution-in2014/$File/ey-us-fund-distribution-report.pdf.
25. A lead generation service is a website that provides information to consumers about a product
and makes money by referring consumers to another company that actually sells the product. Examples
include: Zillow’s mortgage comparison tool and Credit Karma’s credit card comparison tool. See Best
Credit Cards from Our Partners, CREDIT KARMA, https://www.creditkarma.com/credit-cards (last visited

BAKERDELLAERT_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

1/7/2018 11:38 PM

REGULATING ROBO ADVICE

721

products that could be the subject of such robo advice include: deposit
accounts, home mortgages, and other forms of consumer credit from the
banking sector; all of the personal lines of insurance, including auto, life,
disability, health, and homeowners insurance, as well as annuities; and, from
the securities sector, mutual fund shares and other savings products regulated
as securities.26
Our definition of “robo advisor” is closely aligned with what the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) calls “digital investment advice
tools,” which include automated investment analysis and recommendation
services sold to traditional financial advisors.27 Our broader definition
includes both “hybrid robos,” which place a human interface on top of what
is primarily an automated process, and automated portfolio selection and
management tools sold to more traditional financial advisors who provide
services that retain even more of a human touch.28 Like FINRA, we mean to
emphasize the continuities between the new, consumer-facing automated
intermediaries and the kinds of automated services that have previously been
available to traditional intermediaries.29 We expand the term “robo advisor”
even further, however, to include comparably automated services in the
insurance and banking sectors to emphasize the technological and regulatory
continuities across the financial services industry.
A. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS AND REGULATORY OBJECTIVES
In a nutshell, the primary justifications for consumer financial services
regulation are the following: to provide some degree of protection for
Oct. 29, 2017); Compare Mortgage Rates and Home Loans, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/mortgagerates (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
26. Securities issued by operating companies are not consumer financial products in the
sense in which we are using that term. If a financial product intermediary developed and mass
marketed a service that created individualized securities portfolios, we would regard those
portfolios as the consumer product, not the securities in the portfolios, unless consumer financial
product companies started creating securities designed to be included in those portfolios.
27. FINRA, supra note 1, at 2 (dividing digital investment advice tools into two groups:
“financial professional-facing” tools and “client-facing” tools).
28. See, e.g., FRANCIS M. KINNIRY JR. ET AL., VANGUARD RES., PUTTING A VALUE ON YOUR VALUE:
QUANTIFYING VANGUARD ADVISOR’S ALPHA 16 (2016), http://www.vanguard.com/pdf/ISGQVAA.
pdf (noting the benefits that the Vanguard Advisor’s Alpha framework can provide for traditional
financial advisors); Efi Pylarinou, SigFig Advises Hundreds of Billions and Pivots from B2C to B2B, BANK
INNOVATION (Aug. 17, 2015), http://bankinnovation.net/2015/08/sigfig-advises-hundreds-ofbillions-and-pivots-from-b2c-to-b2b (discussing the success of a SigFig tool designed to provide
advice for independent brokers).
29. See FINRA, supra note 1, at 2–3 (describing history of digital investment advice); see also BARR
ET AL., supra note 13, at 471 (automated investment services have been “used for many years by financial
professionals to develop a customer’s trading portfolio”); Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Financial Technology Forum (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/
news/statement/piwowar-statement-financial-technology-forum-111416.html (“FinTech is frequently
lauded as a disruptive force that is transforming the financial services industry . . . .”).
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consumers regarding the safety of their financial products; to protect society
from the negative consequences of the failure of financial product providers;
and to protect consumers from being exploited due to their relative lack of
knowledge about financial products and their dependence on the product
providers.30 In addition, some financial services regulation aims to ameliorate
inequality, for example, by limiting the ability of insurance companies to
charge prices based on risk or requiring banks to provide services within
minority and low income communities.31 Finally, some financial services
regulation aims to advance broader political economy goals, such as anti-trust
regulation, money laundering regulation, and regulations that discourage
financial companies from amassing too much political power.32
The financial services industry and its associated regulatory bodies are
traditionally divided into three major sectors: securities, banking, and
insurance.33 The relative importance of the policy justifications for regulation
differs across these sectors. For example, banking regulation attempts to make
ordinary consumer bank deposits completely safe through a combination of
solvency regulation and deposit insurance,34 and insurance regulation
attempts to make most kinds of consumer insurance almost as completely safe
through solvency regulation and guaranty funds.35 By contrast, securities
regulators do not attempt to make mutual funds or other securities
completely safe. They focus instead on increasing the transparency of

30. See Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory
Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 334–36 (1999). Note that we have simplified Jackson’s framework in
light of our focus on robo advisors. For example, we do not separately identify the objective of
protecting consumers from a financial services provider changing its risk profile after purchase.
31. See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1589–91(2011) (explaining how the ACA restricts
the ability of health insurers to price based on risk). See generally Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D.
Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community
Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237 (1996) (explaining history of the Community Reinvestment
Act and testing the underlying market discrimination thesis).
32. Jackson, supra note 30, at 337; cf. Mark J. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 1906
Pacification of the Insurance Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 639, 639–41 (1993) (asserting the
influence of American politics on the determinacy of corporate structures); Press Release, Dep’t
of Fin. Servs., DFS Issues Final Anti-Terrorism Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program
Regulation (June 30, 2016), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1606301.htm (noting the
announcement of the anti-money laundering regulation by the New York State Department of
Financial Services).
33. Jackson, supra note 30, at 320. Jackson identifies futures trading and pensions as distinct
from ordinary securities transactions. See, e.g., id. at 362. We ignore futures trading and defined
benefit pensions, and we treat defined contribution pensions as securities transactions with an
employment law overlay.
34. Id. at 332–39.
35. Id. at 358. Note that in the insurance sector completely safe means only that the
insurance company has the financial capacity to pay claims, not that the insurance company will
have a perfect record in paying claims.

BAKERDELLAERT_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

REGULATING ROBO ADVICE

1/7/2018 11:38 PM

723

securities markets, preventing fraud, and promoting education and research
that helps consumers manage investment risk.36
In the financial services realm, regulation addresses solvency, entity
organization and licensing, market conduct, and product approval.37 The
aspects of financial services regulation most likely to apply to robo advisors
are those directed at consumer product intermediaries.38 These regulations
apply directly to the companies that create robo advisors when those
companies also function as consumer product intermediaries themselves, and
indirectly when they sell their robo advisor services to consumer product
intermediaries.39 Within the schema of the policy justifications set out above,
protecting consumers from being taken advantage of due to their relative lack
of knowledge about financial products is most relevant to intermediaries. This
justification is important across all three major sectors of the financial services
industry.
Intermediaries like securities brokers, mortgage brokers, and insurance
agents and brokers all have the potential to help consumers make better sense
of the financial services available to them and, accordingly, to ameliorate the
information imbalance between consumers and the producers of financial
products.40 However, there are significant challenges to reaching this

36. Jackson, supra note 30, at 345–46; Toni Williams, Empowerment of Whom and for What? Financial
Literacy Education and the New Regulation of Consumer Financial Services, 29 LAW & POL’Y 226, 232 (2007)
(noting that national regulators in the UK and Canada represent financial education as empowering
consumers to manage investment risks); Investor Alert: Automated Investment Tools, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (May 8, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/autolistingtools
htm.html (providing a general overview of automated investment tools for investors).
37. See generally BARR ET AL., supra note 13 (identifying and discussing agencies responsible
for licensing and entities and supervising market conduct in all three sectors, protecting solvency
in the insurance and banking sectors, and approving products in the insurance sector).
38. Note that different strands of academic literature use the term “intermediary”
differently. For example, in the financial services literature the term is used to refer to banks,
insurance companies, and mutual fund companies. See Jackson, supra note 30, at 328–30. By
contrast, the insurance and industrial organization literatures use the term to refer to
middlemen. See, e.g., Gary Biglaiser & James W. Friedman, Middlemen as Guarantors of Quality, 12
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 509, 509–12 (1994). We use the term to refer to middlemen and to the retail
sales aspects of banks, insurance companies and mutual fund companies. For a survey of
regulatory strategies directed at the retail sales and advising function, see generally Jackson, supra
note 15 (cataloging circumstances in which consumers rely on financial advisors to recommend
products or services and regulatory approaches to addressing the problem of steering based on
side payments to the advisors).
39. See FINRA, supra note 1, at 1.
40. See, e.g., J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of Insurance Intermediaries,
73 J. RISK & INS. 359, 386 (identifying the role of insurance agents and brokers as information
intermediaries in reducing adverse selection); Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman, Insurance
Agents in the 21st Century: The Problem of Biased Advice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN THE LAW
& ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE 36, 41–43 (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015)
(reviewing research on other kinds of intermediaries, such as financial advisors).
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potential.41 Consumers are almost as poorly equipped to identify the quality
of an intermediary as they are to evaluate the quality of the financial
products.42 For example, because they need the help of the intermediary to
evaluate those products, they cannot evaluate the quality of the intermediary
by evaluating the quality of the intermediary’s recommendations. Moreover,
the prevailing commission-based compensation for intermediaries creates
significant conflicts of interests that lead to biased advice.43 Finally, the
diversity and complexity of financial products makes it difficult to be
sufficiently expert to consistently offer good advice, especially across the
range of financial services.
Financial services regulation addresses these challenges using three main
sets of regulatory tools: licensing and education requirements designed to
ensure that an intermediary has at least a minimum level of competence
regarding the products the intermediary is licensed to sell; disclosure
requirements and antifraud rules that require intermediaries to be honest
with their customers; and standards of conduct, such as the fiduciary standard,
designed to encourage intermediaries to match their customers with suitable
financial services.44 These regulatory tools already apply to robo advisors
indirectly, when regulated entities provide robo advice. However, it is
important to consider whether regulators can and should apply any of these
tools directly to the robo advisors themselves, and not just to the currently
licensed and regulated entities that use them.
B. ROBO ADVISORS: COMPETENCE, HONESTY, AND SUITABILITY
We contend that, at least for mass-market consumer financial products,
a well-designed robo advisor will be more competent and suitable than most
human advisors while being as honest as the most honest humans. We
recognize that, by specifying that the advisor be well designed, we are stacking
the deck in favor of robo advisors. At this point, our goal is simply to
41. Jackson, supra note 15, at 83–84.
42. See Schwarcz & Siegelman, supra note 40, at 47–48 tbl.2.1 (summarizing empirical
studies showing “financial intermediaries serving ordinary consumers often offer poor advice”).
43. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE ON
RETIREMENT SAVINGS 13, 15–16 (2015), http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo55500 (identifying
several ways in which conflicts of interest affect the quality of advice and the subsequent
investment performance); Schwarcz & Siegelman, supra note 40, at 44–47 (describing the effect
of intermediaries’ commission-based compensation).
44. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, REVISIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS TO THE UNIFORM LICENSING
STANDARDS (2011), http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_pltf_producer_licensing_ul_
standards_revised.pdf (describing education requirements); Jackson, supra note 30, at 344–45,
349–51 (describing disclosure and anti-fraud rules and standards of conduct); Schwarcz & Siegelman,
supra note 40, at 61–62 (describing licensing requirements). Note that we simplify Jackson’s more
detailed list of regulatory strategies set out in Jackson, supra note 15, at 100 (noting that
“generalizations are tricky given the range of legal regimes”). For present purposes we include price
controls and prohibitions on certain conduct within the general category of standards of conduct.
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demonstrate why it is plausible that a robo advisor could be well designed.
The examples that follow lay the groundwork for our subsequent exploration
of what is involved in assessing whether a robo advisor is well-designed.
1. A Health Insurance Robo Advisor
Our first example is the one with which we have the most experience:
health insurance robo advisors.
i.

Competence

In this context, competence means the ability to help consumers select a
health insurance plan that provides appropriate coverage at a reasonable cost,
taking into account factors such as consumers’ risk aversion with regard to
out-of-pocket payments and their preferences about qualitative differences
among the plans, such as the network of health care providers and the extent
of the health plans’ involvement in managing care.45
ii.

Honesty

Honesty is somewhat harder to define in this and other contexts. In our
view, honesty includes making only true statements about the health plans,
the intermediary’s compensation, and the purchase process. In addition,
honesty should include accurately describing the basis for any
recommendations, making disclosures to correct a misimpression that the
advisor is considering all of the plans in the market if the advisor is not doing
so, disclosing any compensation or other arrangements that might have the
potential to bias the advice adverse to the consumer’s interests, and providing
advice that is not in fact biased in that manner.
A well-designed health insurance robo advisor should provide advice that
is superior to humans working without automated assistance in terms of both
competence and honesty. Even an unbiased and competent human advisor
can at best offer rules of thumb based on the choice patterns that the advisor
has observed or learned about. For example, an experienced broker could
offer advice such as the following: when choosing among the four plans
45. See, e.g., AON RETIREE HEALTH EXCHANGE, https://retiree.aon.com (last visited Oct. 29,
2017). For recent evidence that consumers need this kind of advice even to pick among a small
set of options, see generally Saurabh Bhargava, George Loewenstein & Justin Sydnor, Do
Individuals Make Sensible Health Insurance Decisions? Evidence from a Menu with Dominated Options,
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21160, 2015) (demonstrating that people
made objectively bad decisions when choosing among a small number of health insurance plans).
If the company that creates the robo advisor also functions as an insurance broker, the company
will also need to be competent at brokers’ other functions, such as making sure that the insurance
policy is issued in a timely manner and that consumers’ ongoing customer service needs are met.
These latter functions are obviously very important to consumers, but they are not part of the “robo
advice” we are exploring in this essay, nor do they lie at the core of the comparative advantage of
health insurance robo advisors. Accordingly, we will set them aside for present purposes.

BAKERDELLAERT_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

726

IOWA LAW REVIEW

1/7/2018 11:37 PM

[Vol. 103:713

typically offered at a major U.S. university, the expensive, low-deductible,
broad-network plan is the one preferred by the professors and the doctors at
the university hospital; the cheaper HMO plan is preferred by the staff and
the healthy, young assistant professors.46 Even when such rules of thumb are
correct on average, they will provide the wrong guidance for some people,47
and they are quite unlikely to be helpful when the alternatives expand beyond
a small number of options.48
Health insurance robo advisors can offer richer, more personalized
advice. With access to the right data and the ability to ask a few questions of
the consumer, they can develop reliable predictions of the likely range of costs
under all of the available plans; they can create personalized rankings that use
survey data, expert assessments and other techniques to take into account
both price and non-price features of the plans; they can customize these
rankings based on the risk aversion and other expressed preferences of
individual consumers; and they can do all of this instantaneously with choice
sets of any size.49
In terms of honesty, a robo advisor will always provide the advice that it
is programmed to provide, and it can be programmed in a way that meets a
demanding standard of honesty: making only true statements, disclosing the
methods for providing the advice, and providing advice that takes into
account only factors that are consistent with the consumer’s interests (insofar
as it is possible to know those interests). Indeed, this more demanding honesty
standard should be considered an aspect of what it means to be well-designed.
While human advisors can endeavor to meet this same standard of honesty,
common sense and psychological research make it hard to imagine people
always meeting that standard when they are rewarded in ways that are not fully
aligned with consumer interests.50

46. See generally Pavel Atanasov & Tom Baker, Putting Health Back into Health Insurance Choice,
71 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 337 (2014) (describing plans offered at a large private university).
47. In our university example, there will be some senior faculty who would be well served by
a high deductible plan with an HSA or an HMO, and who would appreciate having a few thousand
more dollars each year to spend on other things, and there also are likely to be some staff and
healthy junior faculty whose preferences for freedom to choose doctors and distaste for both
deductibles and HMOs are sufficient to justify paying the higher price for the low deductible,
broad network plan. See id. at 338.
48. BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 2 (2004) (“[A]s the number
of choices keeps growing, negative aspects of having a multitude of options begin to appear. As the
number of choices grows further, the negatives escalate until we become overloaded.”).
49. See BEN HANDEL & JONATHAN KOLSTAD, HAMILTON PROJECT, GETTING THE MOST FROM
MARKETPLACES: SMART POLICIES ON HEALTH INSURANCE CHOICE 12 (2015), http://www.hamilton
project.org/assets/files/smart_policies_on_health_insurance_choice_final_proposal.pdf.
50. See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING (4th ed. 1988).
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Suitability

Finally, the assessment of the competence of a robo advisor and the
suitability of the products it recommends go hand in hand. By definition, a
competent robo advisor will only recommend suitable products. Indeed,
using difficult test cases to evaluate whether a robo advisor consistently
recommends suitable products is one of the ways to evaluate whether the robo
advisor is well-designed. Humans, however, are different. Even competent
humans make mistakes, and competent humans can also be biased or
dishonest.51 Indeed, it is for this reason that financial services regulators
developed suitability and other conduct standards that permit an after-thefact assessment of whether intermediaries gave good advice.52
2. A Home Mortgage Robo Advisor
Our second example is a home mortgage robo advisor.53
i.

Competence and Suitability

In this context, competence means the ability to help consumers select
the right mortgage at the best rate available.54 Doing this competently
requires taking the relevant details of the consumers’ financial situation into
account, including likely household income over time, amount and timing of
household financial obligations, risk factors associated with the kind of
mortgage in question, the likely length of time before sale of the home, the
consumer’s credit rating, and other factors that people with more domain

51. On competent humans making mistakes, see COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN
AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 63–65 (Linda T. Kohn
et al. eds., 2000) (documenting the extent of medical malpractice and attempting to de-politicize
that issue by emphasizing that humans in all walks of life make mistakes). On competent humans
being biased, see generally Sendhil Mullainathan et al., The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit
Study (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17929, 2012) (noting that financial
advisers tend not to de-bias their clients and instead often reinforce biases that are in their
interests). On competent humans being dishonest, see Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest
People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633, 642 (2008).
52. See Robert H. Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine,
1965 DUKE. L.J. 445, 447–52 (presenting the justifications of and need for a suitability doctrine).
53. We have been unable to find any mortgage robo advisors. The closest service we have
found is Zillow’s mortgage rate comparison feature, which is an advertising and lead generation
tool that does not attempt to match the mortgage types to the consumer’s needs. See Compare
Mortgage Rates and Home Loans, supra note 25 (“We make it easy to see current mortgage rates,
compare multiple mortgage quotes, and sort results to find the lowest fees, APR, or monthly
payment.”); see also MAGNIFYMONEY, http://www.magnifymoney.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2017)
(an example of an additional financial loan lead-generation service).
54. For a description of how difficult this is to do well because of risk-based mortgage
pricing, see Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 123, 138–47 (2007) (comparing transparency of pricing and terms in the prime market
with the subprime market).

BAKERDELLAERT_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

728

1/7/2018 11:37 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:713

expertise than we can identify. As with health insurance, helping consumers
choose the best mortgage is a complicated matching problem that a welldesigned algorithm could execute on a more personalized, consistently
accurate basis than a human.55 Additionally, because the assessment of
competence and suitability go hand in hand, a competent mortgage robo
advisor will only recommend suitable mortgages.56
ii.

Honesty

In the mortgage context, honesty means making only true statements
about a mortgage’s rates and features, the intermediary’s compensation, and
anything else relevant to the mortgage search, application, and closing
process. Honesty also includes accurately describing the basis for any
recommendations, disclosing the risks associated with taking out mortgages
in amounts or types that will be difficult for the consumer to afford, making
common sense disclosures that might be needed to correct a misimpression
regarding what plans the advisor is considering, disclosing the existence of
any compensation or other arrangements that have the potential to bias the
advice in a way that is not consistent with the consumer’s interests, and
providing advice that is not biased in that manner. As with health insurance,
a robo advisor can be programmed to meet this demanding standard of
honesty, and doing so should be considered an aspect of what it means to be
well-designed.

55. Cf. Howell E. Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield
Spread Premiums, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 289, 291–92 (2007) (demonstrating that when human
mortgage brokers are compensated through yield spread premiums they steer consumers to
mortgages with higher interest rates than optimal for consumers). A mortgage robo advisor could
be programmed to prevent this kind of mismatching.
56. If the company that creates the robo advisor also functions as a mortgage broker, it
would need to be competent at making sure that the mortgage is issued in a timely manner. The
full automation of that task is much more difficult—but also potentially much more valuable—
than fully automating the sale of insurance primarily because of the greater risk inherent in
issuing a mortgage. An insurance policy only obligates the insurer to pay costs in the future,
providing insurers the opportunity to police fraud in the sales process after the fact. By contrast,
a mortgage company gives the consumer the money up front in return for the consumer’s
promise to repay the money in the future. Automating that process would be valuable and
potentially part of the comparative advantage of the kind of company that would create a home
mortgage robo advisor. Nevertheless, we will not address it further, except to make two quick
observations. First, because a mortgage issuer gives the consumer the money up front, mortgage
issuers will not agree to issue mortgages on an automated basis at scale without verifying the
competence of that automation. Thus, the potential need for regulatory oversight of this aspect
of automation is less acute than that of the product matching function. Second, the immediate
beneficiaries of fully automated mortgage sales platforms are likely to be consumers with stable
relationships with banks, credit cards, employers, and other large institutions. Thus, full
automation has the potential to raise concerns about the inequality reproducing aspects of the
financial services industry.
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3. An Investment Robo Advisor
Our third example is the one most commonly associated with the label
“robo advisor.”57
i.

Competence

We consider investment robo advisors last, despite the fact that, arguably,
they are the most fully developed financial services robo advisors currently in
the market.58 We leave them for last because it is most obvious to us that the
human financial advisors they are assisting or replacing need to be competent
at many things other than simply matching consumers to products. By
contrast, matching consumers to the relevant financial products is the core
function of insurance and mortgage brokers. Thus, as consumers come to
trust the speed and reliability of robo advisors’ ranking and matching
algorithms and the “always on” nature of automated services, and as the
logistical difficulties of automating the mortgage underwriting process are
overcome, it is easy to imagine automated systems, supplemented perhaps by
call centers, gradually replacing many of the human insurance and mortgage
brokers in the consumer market, as has already happened to travel agents.59
By contrast, matching consumers to financial products is only part of
what a financial advisor can do for clients. A financial advisor can help people
decide how much and how best to save, and, when the time comes, how much
can safely be spent from those savings. Financial advisors can help clients
create plans; they can set up structures and processes for implementing and
sticking to plans; they can counsel clients who do not stick to the plans; and
they can help clients adjust plans when circumstances change. These are in
addition to the more readily automated tasks such as helping consumers
decide how much they should be saving for retirement in light of relevant
considerations regarding their financial situation, providing good advice
about how and when to change or rebalance their investments over time, and
providing projections to guide the retirement and decumulation process,
once again in light of relevant considerations regarding clients’ financial
situation over time.

57. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 17, at 1.
58. For examples of investment robo advisors, see the sources cited supra note 1.
59. See Shea Laverty, Impact of Technology on the Travel Agency Business, CHRON, http://small
business.chron.com/impact-technology-travel-agency-business-57750.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2017)
(highlighting how technology has changed the travel agency business). We distinguish between forms
of insurance that, because of legal or contractual requirements, are not optional for consumers (e.g.,
auto and homeowners) and forms of insurance that are optional (e.g., life and disability insurance).
For the latter forms of insurance, persuading people to buy them is also a core function, one that we
expect will increasingly be the province of general purpose financial advisors and subject to automation
through that channel.
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Many financial advisors focus their efforts on selling financial products
that generate commissions and fees, rather than on planning and coaching,
and this helps explain why regulators and others have focused on the
incentives that can distort the matching function of financial advisors.60 Yet,
planning and coaching can be more important than matching customers to
products. For example, a financial advisor who exclusively recommends
financial products that spin off high fees and commissions, but is good at
getting her clients to adopt routines that allow them to live within their means
and save and, consequently, to feel financially secure, may be helping her
clients more than the financial advisor who scrupulously recommends
optimal investments but is hopeless at helping clients to save and live within
their means.
As existing investment robo advisors demonstrate, designers can easily
automate product matching and other aspects of investing, such as
rebalancing,61 for investors who are prepared to adopt the passive investing
strategy recommended by disinterested finance researchers.62 Relationship
management and other, more difficult to model aspects of the work of
financial advisors are harder to automate. Accordingly, the robo advisors with
the largest and fastest growing market shares sell their services through or to
human financial advisors.63 For example, the two largest sellers of passive
investment funds in the United States—Vanguard and BlackRock—both now
offer “hybrid robo” services that place a human relationship layer on top of a
highly automated process, for which consumers pay a management fee that is
somewhat higher than the fee for the fully automated robo advisors, but much
less than half of the fee of traditional financial advisors.64 As robo advisors
60. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 43, at 15–16.
61. Passive investing refers to investing in funds that attempt simply to match the
performance of the class of securities to which the fund is indexed. At present, investment robo
advisors often employ algorithms to match consumers to a mix of exchange traded (index) funds
based on the consumers’ age, risk tolerance, and time horizon, among other factors. Rebalancing
is the process of periodically adjusting the mix of investments so that differences in the relative
performance of the investments do not lead the investor’s portfolio to shift away from the
preferred mix. For a description of what it would mean for an investment robo advisor to be well
designed, see FINRA, supra note 1, at 8–9.
62. See, e.g., BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED
STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 288 (11th ed. 2016).
63. Peggy Collins & Charles Stein, The Vanguard Cyborg Takeover, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 24,
2016, 11:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-24/the-vanguard-cyborgtakeover (noting that the Vanguard Group’s hybrid robo advisor has surpassed standalone robo
advisors); Vanguard and Schwab Hybrids Trump Pure Robos in Assets, FIN. ADVISOR IQ (Mar. 29,
2016), https://financialadvisoriq.com/c/1323523/147603 (discussing the success of Vanguard
Group’s and Schwab’s hybrid models over the standalone robo advisors).
64. Clint Boulton, Roboadvisors Stand at the Vanguard of Human-Machine Collaboration, CIO (Mar.
25, 2016, 12:02 PM), http://www.cio.com/article/3048318/vertical-industries/roboadvisors-stand-atthe-vanguard-of-human-machine-collaboration.html (describing Vanguard Group’s hybrid services);
With FutureAdvisor, BlackRock Seeks to Compete with Schwab, Vanguard, THINKADVISOR (June 14, 2016),
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gradually replace the product matching function and other functions that are
easily automated, it is possible that in the retail consumer market, financial
advisors will largely replace stock brokers and that financial advisors
increasingly will compete on the basis of their ability to do more of the
planning and coaching aspects of their job.65 We would applaud such a result,
and we are sufficiently confident that it will take place that we have begun
advising undergraduates who express an interest in helping professions such
as nursing and social work to also consider careers in financial planning.
ii.

Honesty

As in the health insurance context, there are different potential
standards of honesty. At a minimum in our opinion, honesty means making
only true statements about the products, the advisor’s compensation, and
anything else that is relevant to the products, the advice, and the purchase
process, and honesty should also include accurately describing the basis for
any recommendations, making any common sense disclosures that might be
needed to correct a misimpression that the advisor is considering all of the
products in the market if the advisor is not doing so, disclosing the existence
of any compensation or other arrangements that might have the potential to
bias the advice in a way that is not consistent with consumer’s interests, and
providing advice that is not biased in that manner.66
iii.

Suitability

As with insurance and banking robo advisors, suitability goes hand in
hand with competence for an investment robo advisor. A competent
investment robo advisor will only recommend or make investments that are
suitable for the consumer who is relying on the robo advisor, whether directly
or indirectly.67

http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2016/06/14/with-futureadvisor-blackrock-seeks-to-compete-with
(noting that BlackRock acquired FutureAdvisor to develop its hybrid services).
65. See Ryan VanGrack et al., supra note 17, at 12 (“[D]igital allows you to scale the service
model of the existing financial advisory ecosystem by taking some of the workload off of financial
advisors so they can focus on the unique differentiation and unique value added in terms of
coaching, [and] relationship building with their clients . . . .”). See generally David Dubofsky & Lyle
Sussman, The Changing Role of the Financial Planner Part 1: From Financial Analytics to Coaching and
Life Planning, 22 J. FIN. PLAN. 48 (2009) (discussing similar changes for financial planners).
66. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 17, at 3–5 (listing disclosures that robo
advisers might make).
67. See id. at 7. The SEC’s recent Investment Management Guidance Update for robo advisors
raises the interesting complication of a robo advisor that gives clients the opportunity to choose
investments that the robo advisor did not recommend and, thus, that may not be suitable for the
investor according to the algorithm in the robo adviser. See id. The guidance document concludes:
[A] robo-adviser should consider providing commentary as to why it believes
particular portfolios may be more appropriate for a given investment objective and
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ROBO ADVISORS: NEW REGULATORY CHALLENGES

The discussion so far suggests that a well-designed robo advisor will be
competent and honest, and it will recommend to a consumer only financial
products that are suitable for that consumer. Of course, by specifying that the
robo advisors will be “well designed,” we have stacked the deck in their favor.
This is not because we believe that robo advisors necessarily will be well
designed. Indeed, we believe the contrary.68
While robo advisors have the potential to outperform humans in
matching consumers to mass market financial products, they are not
inherently immune from the misalignment of incentives that has historically
affected financial product intermediaries.69 A robo advisor can be designed
to ignore those incentives, but many consumer financial product
intermediaries that develop or purchase robo advisors are subject to those
incentives.70 It would be naïve to simply assume that intermediaries will always
choose the algorithms and choice architecture that are best for consumers,
rather than those that are best for the intermediaries.
This means that regulators should take a more active role in assessing
robo advisors as robo advisors grow in scale. Indeed, the same returns to scale
that make a robo advisor cost-effective lead to similar returns to scale in
assessing the quality of a robo advisor. An expert administrative agency is well
situated to realize those returns to scale. Moreover, the potential solvency and
systemic risks posed by hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of consumers
choosing their financial products based on the same or similar models are
sufficiently large and different in kind from those traditionally posed by

risk profile. In this regard, a robo-adviser may wish to consider whether pop-up boxes
or other design features would be useful to alert a client of potential inconsistencies
between the client’s stated objective and the selected portfolio.
Id.
68. For example, our research and that of our collaborator Eric Johnson demonstrate how
simple choice architecture techniques can be used to mislead consumers, especially when
combined with a biased or inaccurate ranking algorithm. See generally Benedict G.C. Dellaert,
Tom Baker & Eric J. Johnson, Sorted Partitioned Sets as Personalized Choice Architecture,
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (presenting results of experiment in which changing
the order of the presentation of plans changed consumer choices); see also generally Peter A. Ubel, David
A. Comerford & Eric Johnson, Healthcare.gov 3.0—Behavioral Economics and Insurance Exchanges, 372
NEW ENG. J. MED. 695 (2015) (presenting results of an experiment in which switching the metals
assigned to plans changed consumer choices); Harris Meyer, Copycat Enrollment Websites Hamper ACA
Sign-up Efforts, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20161025/NEWS/161029946/copycat-enrollment-websites-hamper-aca-sign-up-efforts (discussing
the impact of misleading enrollment sites on health insurance enrollment through healthcare.gov).
69. See Fligstein & Roehrkasse, supra note 2, at 625; Schwarcz & Siegelman, supra note 40,
at 64–66.
70. See, e.g., Schwarcz & Siegelman, supra note 40, at 625.
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consumer financial product intermediaries to justify regulatory attention on
those grounds alone.71
The smart thing for regulators to do is to start developing the necessary
capacities now, when the stakes are lower, and when consumers are still
sufficiently uncertain about robo advisors that some firms may actually
welcome the legitimation that could accompany independent certification of
the quality of robo advice.72 Indeed, we predict that at least some powerful
actors in the financial services sector will decide to support such regulatory
initiatives in order to be in a position to shape them in a manner that they
believe is sensible, as the largest asset management company in the United
States has already signaled that it is prepared to do.73
Toward that end, we offer two sets of conceptually framing ideas. First,
based on our investigation of existing robo advisors across the three main
sectors of the financial services industry, we have identified four core
components of robo advisors that require distinct capacities to assess: (1) the
ranking or matching algorithms and related processes; (2) the customer and
financial product data to which the algorithms or other matching processes
are applied; (3) the choice architecture through which the advice is delivered;
and (4) the information technology infrastructure. Second, because there is
so little research and analysis available to guide the regulation of robo advisors
today and because the need for and corresponding returns to regulatory
oversight will increase as the scale of robo advice increases, we propose a
regulatory trajectory, rather than a regulatory agenda, that starts by building
the necessary human capital. Only then will policymakers be equipped to set
a regulatory agenda.
A. COMPONENTS OF ROBO ADVISORS THAT POSE REGULATORY
CHALLENGES
In discussing these core components of robo advisors, our goal is to
provide a basic introduction and some examples of the issues that can arise in
assessing competence, honesty, and suitability. To make these assessments,
regulatory agencies will need to develop the appropriate, domain-specific
scientific and engineering expertise to go beyond our generalizations. Until
they do so, robo advisors will be “regulated” only by their contracting partners
and through the application of more general legal requirements such as those

71. See infra Part III.
72. See Stein, supra note 16 (“Clearly, if we want our markets to remain at the top, we need
to embrace innovation. And FinTech clearly promises some exciting advances. But, we also need
to be prepared to anticipate and ideally prevent problems before they arise. Remaining
competitive requires both market participants and regulators to thoughtfully evolve with
innovation, not react to it way after the fact.”).
73. See BLACKROCK, supra note 22, at 8.
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governing privacy, data security, and unfair and deceptive trade practices.74
While those existing safeguards and requirements provide some protection
for consumers, they are unlikely to be enough once robo advisors reach mass
market scale. Even if market forces and existing safeguards somehow manage
to ensure that robo advisors are honest and competent from the perspective
of individual consumers, they cannot address the problems of scale. As we
discuss in greater detail below, the problems of scale are classic collectiveaction problems, in which the combination of individually rational actions
produces a collectively irrational result.75
1. Ranking or Matching Algorithms and Processes
An algorithm is a formula, or formal statement of rules, that guides a
process.76 For robo advisors, the key algorithms are those that rank the
financial products for consumers to select, and if the robo advisor makes the
selection, the algorithm then matches consumers with products. Each
algorithm is embodied in software code that is based on a model of how to
optimize the fit between the attributes of the financial products available to
the consumer and the attributes of the consumers who are using the robo
advisor.
Traditionally, analysts and developers that create matching and ranking
algorithms have an explicit, articulable model, based on ideas about which
product attributes are desirable to people with certain attributes. For
example, developers may program an investment robo advisor to recommend
that the mix of bond and stock funds in a consumer’s retirement savings
portfolio gradually shift over time so that the portfolio becomes more heavily
weighted with bond funds as the consumer ages.77 Likewise, an analyst could
program a mortgage robo advisor to present the mortgages to a consumer in
a ranking that is negatively correlated with the estimated risk of payment

74. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2016) (setting forth the HIPAA regulations); REVISED UNIF.
DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1966)
(providing the standard for some states’ laws regulating deceptive practices); Press Release, Dep’t
of Fin. Servs., Governor Cuomo Announces First-in-the-Nation Cybersecurity Regulation
Protecting Consumers and Financial Institutions from Cyber-Attacks to Take Effect March 1 (Feb.
16, 2017), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1702161.htm (describing Governor Cuomo’s
cybersecurity regulation).
75. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244–45 (1968).
76. See Kroll et al., supra note 4, at 640 n.14; see also Mike Ananny, Toward an Ethics of
Algorithms: Convening, Observation, Probability, and Timeliness, 41 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 93,
97 (2016) (“Computer science defines an algorithm as a ‘description of the method by which a
task is to be accomplished.’”).
77. This is standard procedure in a target date retirement fund. See, e.g., Olivia S. Mitchell
& Stephen Utkus, Target-Date Funds in 401(K) Retirement Plans 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 17911, 2012).
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shocks or other features that increase the rate of default for a mortgage.78
Further, developers may program a health insurance robo advisor to rank
health plans as a function of the total cost of the health plans for the
individual consumer or a function of a set of cost and quality factors.79
Our sense is that most or all robo advisors presently in operation
primarily use algorithms of this sort, meaning that they adhere to a readily
explainable and examinable logic.80 To assess the competence of these
algorithms, some of the information that regulators could require from the
consumer product intermediaries include:
(1) explanations of the models and the data upon which the models
are based;
(2) evidence regarding the appropriateness of the data used to
create the model, including the kinds of data-related problems
described in relation to customer and product data below;
(3) explanations of the outcomes that the algorithms are seeking;
(4) evidence that the algorithms perform in the way that they are
designed;
(5) evidence of how the creators of the robo advisor are measuring
whether the algorithm is succeeding and what they are doing in
response;

78. See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 54, at 153 (arguing in favor of disclosing the potential for
payment shocks and prepayment penalties).
79. See, e.g., Dellaert, Baker & Johnson, supra note 68, at 14 (reporting how consumer
selections changed when a leading private health insurance exchange shifted from a pure costbased ranking to a cost/quality based ranking); Ellen McGeoch et al., What’s the Bottom Line?
Total Cost Estimators on the Health Insurance Marketplace (June 26, 2017) (unpublished research
poster, AcademyHealth Annual Research Meeting) (reporting on variations in total cost calculators
among different health insurance exchanges). The Aon Retiree Exchange is an example of a
sophisticated health insurance robo advisor that considers both cost and quality in the U.S. context,
powered by Picwell. See AON RETIREE HEALTH EXCHANGE, supra note 45.
80. In many other areas, and even for some aspects of some robo advisors today, software
developers use “machine learning” algorithms, which are quite different. Machine learning
algorithms are created by software programs that search for patterns in “big data.” Algorithms
created by machine learning programs identify predictive, not causal, relationships between
variables, and they are often not intelligible to humans, including their creators. Thus they
present a greater challenge to transparency than the kinds of algorithms we describe in the main
text. See generally Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making
in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147 (2017) (exploring whether administrative law
restricts government agencies from using machine learning algorithms). For an example of a
health insurance robo advisor using machine learning techniques to build a component of the
model, see PICWELL, http://picwell.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2017) (explaining that Picwell uses
health insurance claims data and machine learning techniques to identify the “people like me”
aspect of the Picwell cost prediction algorithm).
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(6) explanations of what other alternatives the robo advisor creators
considered and rejected; and
(7) other kinds of evidence and explanations that people with more
specific domain knowledge can suggest.81
Of course, gathering all this information is just a start. The regulator must
exercise good judgment based on this evidence, informed by domain-specific
expertise.
To assess the honesty of the algorithms, regulators will need to review the
accuracy of the algorithm descriptions provided to consumers as compared
to the information about the algorithms provided to the regulators.
Additionally, regulators will need to require demonstrations that the
algorithms do not take into account—directly or indirectly—factors that
would bias the outcomes in a way that harms consumers. For example, it
would be improper for a matching algorithm to take into account either the
size of the commission or fee paid to the financial product intermediary or a
proxy for that commission or fee.82 Indeed, the fact that it is possible to
prevent algorithms from taking such factors into account represents a
significant improvement over a human-based system, as it has been
notoriously difficult to police the practice of steering clients and customers to
the products that provide the best benefits to the intermediaries, not to the
customers.83
In the securities context, the 2016 FINRA report on digital investment
advice provides more detailed, domain specific descriptions of “effective
practices” for FINRA-registered firms to use to assess the algorithms in
investment robo advisors.84 These practices could provide the basis for the
development of disclosure requirements, and it is likely that parties who
81. See, e.g., FINRA, supra note 1, at 5. We have been unable to find any examples of banking
or insurance regulators producing similar reports or guidance.
82. A recent lawsuit alleges that a robo advisor designer and a major investment management
company colluded “to design a robo-adviser program to steer [users] toward investments that paid [the
investment management company] high fees.” Diana Novak Jones, Morningstar, Prudential Face Class
Action over Robo-Adviser, LAW360 (Aug. 4, 2017, 2:55 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/951428/
morningstar-prudential-face-class-action-over-robo-adviser; see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra
note 17, at 3 (noting that an investment robo adviser, as defined in that guidance statement, is a
fiduciary and, thus, must provide disclosures that are “sufficiently specific so that a client is able to
understand the investment adviser’s business practices and conflicts of interest”). We question whether
mere disclosure should be adequate.
83. In our experience studying and working in and around the financial services industry
for decades, we have yet to meet anyone in the industry who believes that human consumer
product intermediaries compensated on commission are consistently able to resist steering their
customers to products that pay higher commissions. For research on this topic, see COUNCIL OF
ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 43; Schwarcz & Siegelman, supra note 40, at 36–37; Mullainathan et
al., supra note 51, at 1–5.
84. See FINRA, supra note 1, at 3–6. It is interesting to observe the degree of variation in the
investment algorithms employed by the (anonymous) firms that FINRA used as the basis for the report.
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believe that they have been injured by robo advisors will attempt to use these
practices as standards of conduct in the litigation context. This is the kind of
early effort that would be appropriate for the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, or one of the active state insurance departments,
to take in the context of the emerging insurance web brokers that employ
simple recommendation tools and that the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau should consider taking in the context of the emerging online tools
for comparing mortgages and credit cards.85
2. Customer and Product Data
A high-quality ranking or matching algorithm will guide consumers to
high-quality decisions only in combination with adequate data of two types:
(1) the relevant attributes of the products available to the consumer, which
must include an adequate representation of the variety of potentially suitable
products available in the market to provide meaningful choice; and (2) the
relevant attributes of the consumers for whom the algorithm is ranking or
matching the products. There are two distinct categories of problems related
to both of these data types: access and quality.
Data Access. With the notable exception of publicly traded securities86 and
some types of health insurance,87 there are no public repositories of the kind
of detailed financial product attribute data that a robo advisor needs in order
to function. Therefore, absent robustly enforced legal requirements
obligating product suppliers to provide such data to public repositories, robo
advisors’ only source of financial product data is from the product suppliers
or their agents. These suppliers may be reluctant to provide these data for any
number of reasons. A supplier may not maintain electronic records of their
products that include all of the attributes employed in the robo advisors’
algorithms; the supplier may update the price or other attributes of its
85. See, e.g., COVERHOUND, https://coverhound.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2017) (providing an
example of an insurance webbroker); MAGNIFYMONEY, http://www.magnifymoney.com (last visited
Oct. 29, 2017) (providing an example of a consumer credit comparison tool); see also Memorandum
from the Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Health Ins. Marketplace Guidance 11–12 (Nov. 8,
2016), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Marketplaces/
Downloads/Role-of-ABs-in-Marketplace_Nov-2016_Final.pdf (illustrating how one regulator is
attempting to regulate simple insurance robo advisers by requiring them to show the prices for all plans
available in the marketplace).
86. The easy access to comprehensive, public securities data may be the reason that
investment robo advisors are more developed than other robos. It is interesting to note that the
FINRA report does not mention access to product data, perhaps because of the assumption that
member firms already have access to all of the relevant securities data. With regard to customer
data, FINRA emphasizes only that for at least some kinds of investment advice it is important to
obtain a full description of the customer’s portfolio. See FINRA, supra note 1, at 11.
87. Health Insurance Marketplace Public Use Files (Marketplace PUFs), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/data-resources/marketplace-puf.html
(last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
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products more frequently and dynamically than the robo advisor is able to
accommodate; a supplier may believe that its product data records contain
valuable proprietary pricing or underwriting information that cannot be
trusted with the robo advisor; a supplier may believe that its products will not
show well in comparison to other products; or a supplier may not wish to sell
their products through the channels served by the robo advisor. Undoubtedly,
there are other business reasons that make a supplier reluctant to provide
data. Even if suppliers are obligated to provide some information about their
products to regulators, the data may not be adequate for robo advisors
because the regulator may not make the data publicly available, the data may
not be in machine readable form, the data may not include all of the relevant
product attributes, or the data may not be publicly released in time for the
robo advisor to use it.
Customer data can of course be collected directly from customers while
providing the robo advice to consumers. However, that can be burdensome
for the customers, and they may not in fact possess, or have easy access to, the
data that the robo advisor needs.88 Thus, the more efficient and accurate
approach in many cases would be to collect consumer data from third
parties,89 but those third parties may not maintain the information in a format
that is accessible or they may not be willing to provide the information due to
concerns related to fraud, legal constraints on providing the data, or other
reasons.90
Regulators should be asking three kinds of questions related to accessing
data. First, has the robo advisor obtained access to reasonable sources of data,
and are there any concerns that inability to obtain data, particularly regarding
products, will bias the rankings and matching in a way that disadvantages
consumers in relation to intermediaries and sellers? Second, where there are
gaps in data, what are the strategies that the robo advisor considered to
address those gaps, why did the robo advisor choose the strategy(ies) that it
employed, and was that choice reasonable? Third, does the regulator have the

88. For example, a health insurance robo advisor may need medical utilization records, a
mortgage robo advisor may need detailed income or expense records, and an investment robo
advisor may need detailed asset/investment records.
89. See PWC: FS VIEWPOINT, SIGNIFICANT OTHERS: HOW FINANCIAL FIRMS CAN MANAGE THIRD
PARTY RISKS 4, 8 (2015), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/publications/viewpoints/
assets/pwc-third-party-vendor-risk-management.pdf (showing that 57% of survey respondents have an
accurate inventory of all third parties that handle sensitive firm, employee, and customer data).
90. Vendor and Third Party Management, FFIEC: IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK INFOBASE, http://it
handbook.ffiec.gov/it-booklets/retail-payment-systems/retail-payment-systems-risk-management/
operational-risk/vendor-and-third-party-management.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2017) (providing
guidelines for third-party data risk management); PWC, supra note 90, at 1 (noting that third parties
have created problems for financial services institutions by mishandling consumer data).
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authority, whether formal or informal, to increase access to data and thereby
improve the quality of the robo advice?91
Data quality. Even assuming the data are available, there will be significant
problems regarding the completeness and accuracy of the data, particularly
in the early stages of the development of robo advisors.92 In our interactions
in and around the financial services field, we have found that there is an
inverse relationship between people’s experience working with data and their
expectations regarding the completeness and accuracy of data. In our
experience, people who work with data always expect to find problems with
data; people who do not work with data tend to over-estimate the
completeness and accuracy of data. To the extent that regulators lack
experience, they may be over-trusting robo advisor assurances and, thus,
demand less evidence that the robo advisors have adequately tested the
accuracy and completeness of the data and that they have developed
reasonable strategies to deal with missing or obviously incorrect data.
Accordingly, regulators need to develop the capacity to ask hard, domainspecific questions about data quality and to evaluate the responses.
3. Choice Architecture
Robo advisors typically use automated processes to communicate their
advice, whether directly to consumers in the case of a consumer-facing robo
advisor or to a human intermediary in the case of more traditional automated
tools. In the case of a consumer-facing robo advisor, there may also be the
option, or even requirement, of closing the sale with human assistance
through a call center or a chat function.93 In all these cases, the robo advice
is embodied in a ranked set of alternatives and information about those
alternatives. Behavioral science research demonstrates the very large effects
that choice architecture—the organization of the context in which people
make decisions—can have on decisions.94 For example, the order in which
options are presented, the number of options that are presented, the
attributes of the options presented (and in which order), the framing of

91. The CFPB’s recent focus on encouraging banks to provide access to personal financial
management software services is encouraging, as those services are likely to be an important
provider of robo advice. See CFPB, Request for Information Regarding Consumer Access to
Financial Records, 81 Fed. Reg. 83,806, 83,808 (Nov. 22, 2016).
92. See, e.g., MASS. SEC. DIV., supra note 22, at 5 (noting that one of the problems of robo advisors
is data inaccuracy).
93. See, e.g., EHEALTH, https://www.ehealthinsurance.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2017) (providing
chat and call center options).
94. Thaler and Sunstein coined the term “choice architecture.” RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3–4, 81–100
(2008). The literature is vast and growing. For a recent review, see generally Eric J. Johnson et al.,
Beyond Nudges: Tools of a Choice Architecture, 23 MARKETING LETTERS 487 (2012) (examining the tools
available for choice architects and their importance to decision-makers).
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options (e.g., gain versus loss), all have major impacts.95 This means that the
way that robo advice is presented can have a profound effect on whether and
how consumers use that advice.96 Thus, as in the case of ranking or matching
algorithms, there may be a role for regulators in assessing the competence
and honesty of the choice architecture and the suitability of the products that
it favors.
As Richard Thaler is fond of saying, salesmen have always intuitively
understood the power of choice architecture.97 Systematic research on choice
architecture provides a vocabulary and a set of assessment tools. The
challenge for financial services regulators is to gather and extend the relevant
domain specific research. The goal should be developing the capacity to
evaluate whether robo advisors’ choice architecture is appropriate and does
not undermine the quality of the ranking or matching algorithms.
Incompetent choice architecture may lead consumers away from the bestranked products or prevent them from buying altogether. For example, this
could occur if robo advisors present products in an overly complex fashion.
Regulators should also be looking out for choice architecture techniques that
steer consumers in a manner that benefits the intermediary notwithstanding
a neutral, merits-based ranking or matching algorithm.
There is too much learning from the choice architecture research to
meaningfully summarize it here. What we can do is to note that behavioral
scientists are developing ideas about best practices that will be useful to both
robo advisors and regulators learning to assess robo advisors.98 For example,
robo advisors could assist consumers by making it easy to access their
personally highest-ranked products in the market—even if those products are
not the most profitable for the intermediary to sell—or they could update
consumers on a yearly basis if it would be beneficial for them to switch to a
more fitting product. Robo advisors could also design ranked sets of products
in a format that facilitates easy consumer comparison and provides assistance
in making a decision.99 Finally, rigorous experimental testing is an important
best practice that provides a record that could be made available for
regulators to review in assessing whether the robo advisors have engaged in a
meaningful and empirically informed choice architecture effort.
95. Johnson et al., supra note 94, at 488–96.
96. See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 7, at 4–8 (demonstrating that pre-checking the best
value plan and providing a simple demonstration of how the best value plan was selected
substantially increased the percentage of consumers that chose the best value plan as compared
to simply showing the consumers the value of the plans).
97. See E-mail from Richard Thaler, Professor, John R. Raben/Sullivan & Cromwell
Fellowship Lecture, Yale Law School, to author (Aug. 25, 2017, 3:18 PM) (on file with author).
98. See Memorandum from John P. Holdren, Dir., to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies
(Sept. 15, 2016) (providing best practices guidance for agencies seeking to apply behavioral
science insights to federal programs).
99. See id. at 2, 6.
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Experimental testing, verification that the testing occurred, and
verification that designers implemented the choice architecture that came out
best for consumers in the testing, is easiest to do when the choice
environment is fully automated.100 To our knowledge, there has not yet been
research on “hybrid robo” environments, such as (1) a consumer financial
product intermediary that uses robo advisors behind the scenes and humans
to interact with customers; or (2) a web-based intermediary that encourages
or requires customers to make a phone call or use the chat function to ask
questions and close the deal. Intuitively, the human/machine handoff
provides significant opportunities to take advantage of consumers, for
example through a “bait and switch,” which involves offering additional
options or pointing out features the robo advice did not emphasize. To
evaluate these risks, regulators could require the intermediary to track the
robo advice provided in each case and the products that the consumer
purchased so the regulator could evaluate whether there are any systematic
patterns to the cases in which the consumers did not follow the robo advice
and, if so, require the intermediary to explain those patterns and demonstrate
that the patterns are in the consumers’ best interests. Indeed, the
intermediary should already be collecting and analyzing that information for
its own purposes. Thus, requiring that information should not impose an
unreasonable burden.
Notably, the 2016 FINRA report regarding the identification of effective
practices regarding algorithms and customer data is silent on the topic of
choice architecture.101 This is an unfortunate gap in an otherwise forwardthinking report, especially due to the consumer exploitation risks in the
machine/human interface.
4. Information Technology Infrastructure
Assessing the security and stability of information technology
architecture is an increasingly important aspect of financial services
regulation that extends well beyond robo advisors.102 Financial services
regulators already appear to recognize the need to enhance their capacities
in this area,103 and the technical aspects of this lie far from our comparative
advantage. Accordingly, we will not address this topic further, other than to
offer two related observations. First, overly demanding information
technology infrastructure requirements could serve as barriers to entry for
100. John R. Hauser et al., Website Morphing, 28 MARKETING SCI. 202, 213 (2009).
101. See generally FINRA, supra note 1. Perhaps for this reason the September 2016 BlackRock
white paper on digital investment advice does not address choice architecture either. See generally
BLACKROCK, supra note 22.
102. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Fin. Servs., supra note 32; see also BLACKROCK, supra note
22, at 8.
103. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Fin. Servs., supra note 32.
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innovative new enterprises.104 Second, regulators could address this concern
by developing a strategy for new market entrants that increases the level of
scrutiny with the scale of the enterprise and forgoing such scrutiny altogether
for early-stage robo advisors and those with small market share, provided the
small entrants only sell their services to businesses that have significant
incentive to ensure an adequate information technology infrastructure.105
B. SCALE AND THE CONCEPT OF A REGULATORY TRAJECTORY
At a general level, the benefits of closer regulation of consumer financial
product advice depend on the amount of harm that the advice could cause to
consumers. Conceptually, the amount of this harm is a function of three
factors: (1) the number of consumers affected by the potentially harmful
action; (2) the probability of the harmful action occurring in the market, and
(3) the severity of the consequence of the harmful action to the consumer.
When more consumers are affected, when the harmful action is easy to
introduce into the market, and when the severity of harm from the action is
high, the need for regulation is greater.
All three factors have the potential to increase along with the market
share of robo advisors. First, a successful robo advisor has the capacity to reach
many more consumers than any single human advisor. Second, as the market
share of robo advisors increases, there will be greater opportunities for robo
advisors to fail. Third, because robo advisors may give more comprehensive
and detailed advice than any single human advisor,106 the potential harmful
consequences of the robo advice to the individual consumer may be larger
than that of a human advisor who operates within a narrower domain. Fourth,
if one robo advisor gains truly massive market share, or if the models
underlying competing robo advisors are sufficiently alike, there is a risk of

104. KPMG recently identified “[c]ybersecurity and consumer data privacy” as one of the “[t]en
key regulatory challenges [f]acing the financial services industry in 2017.” PHILIP MACFARLANE
& KAREN STAINES, KPMG, TEN KEY REGULATORY CHALLENGES FACING THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
INDUSTRY IN 2017 1, 5 (2017), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/sg/pdf/2017/02/Tenkey-regulatory-challenges-facing-the-financial-services-industry.pdf. This report identified a range of
regulatory activity taking place across multiple agencies and levels of government. Id. at 1. Just keeping
track of all of the potentially applicable changes could be a difficult challenge for a small company. See
id. (laying out potential financial regulatory reforms which may adversely affect businesses).
105. For examples of regulators attempting to be more accessible and flexible for emerging
businesses, see generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PROJECT CATALYST REPORT: PROMOTING
CONSUMER-FRIENDLY INNOVATION (2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/1331/10
2016_cfpb_Project_Catalyst_Report.pdf; FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, REGULATORY SANDBOX (2015),
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/project-innovate-innovation-hub/regulatory-sandbox.
106. For example, a robo advisor may be able to provide recommendations based on more
advanced personalized projections of future income streams or spending patterns and
considering a broader portfolio of financial products than a human advisor.
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highly correlated losses that could even pose systemic risk.107 Finally, as robo
advisors gain scale, there may be collective-action problems that arise from
ranking and matching services that are individually rational but have perverse
consequences for financial product markets.
To further illustrate this line of reasoning, consider the impact of Google
or Yelp on tourists’ search for a restaurant in a new town as compared to the
traditional approach of asking the hotel concierge for a restaurant
recommendation. Google’s scale compared to the concierge is tremendous.
It provides access to restaurant information to all tourists in all towns, and it
is easily accessible to everyone. If it gives systematically bad restaurant advice,
the impact will be much greater than bad advice given by any individual
concierge. Even if the advice given by hotel concierges is on average just as
bad, the advice given by many individual concierges would be bad in many
different ways. Of course, the consequences of providing poor restaurant
advice even on a large scale seem sufficiently small that regulating Google’s
or Yelp’s restaurant reviews seems unlikely to be necessary. However, the
consequences of poor financial advice can be severe even in an individual
instance, and potentially catastrophic on a large scale.
The potential collective-action problems are more difficult to predict.
One potential example relates to a familiar problem in machine learning: the
trade-off between exploitation and exploration in learning algorithms.108 If
an algorithm is to learn, it must sometimes make a choice that is less than
optimal, based on current information.109 It must explore, rather than exploit.
Yet, when the algorithm is part of a robo advisor, each individual consumer
would prefer that the algorithm exploit, just as each individual user of the
navigation app Waze would prefer that the app provide the shortest route
based on known information and not send the user on an exploratory
route.110
The second potential collective action problem results from the game
theoretic nature of driving. Continuing with the Waze example, my travel time
is a function not only of the distance between point A and point B but also of
who else is on the road, and I can only control my own driving. If Waze
employs an individually rational, or greedy, algorithm, it will always give me
the best route in light of what everyone else is doing. Yet, as the famous

107.

See O’NEIL, supra note 5, at 199–218; cf. CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING
3–14 (Princeton Univ. Press 1999) (1984).
108. See generally John Langford et al., Competitive Analysis of the Explore/Exploit Tradeoff
(2002), https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~jcl/papers/exp_exp_icml/icml_final.pdf (investigating the
explore/exploit trade-off in reinforcement learning using learning algorithms).
109. Id. at 1–2.
110. See WAZE, https://www.waze.com/en-GB (last visited Oct. 29, 2017) (describing an app
which provides live traffic information and routes drivers to their destinations using the shortest
route possible taking into consideration traffic patterns and trends).
WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES
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Braess’s paradox shows, individually rational driving behavior can lead to
slower traffic overall, as everyone competes for the best route.111 Thus,
widespread adoption of a greedy Waze program could lead to longer drives
for everyone. There are solutions, but those solutions require marginal cost
pricing, which Waze cannot implement on its own, or for Waze to send some
drivers on slower routes than other drivers, which violates the assumption of
individually greedy route assignment.112 Algorithms that favor some people
over others should of course raise red flags.
Financial services also have a game theoretic structure. The cost of my
insurance is a function not only of my risk but also of the risk of the other
people in my pool. Similarly, the cost of my credit is a function not only of my
credit risk but also the credit risk of the other people who are in my pool. In
both cases, my costs depend on who is in the pool because the pool bears the
costs of the insurance claims and bad debts of the members of the pool. In a
world of perfect information, risk-based pricing could cut the link between
my cost and those of the pool, but we do not live in that world.113 Finally, the
returns on my portfolio depend not only on the underlying businesses whose
shares and bonds are in the portfolio, but also the investing behavior of other
people.114 At sufficient scale, robo advice can shape insurance and credit
pools and even move investment markets. For example, the tsunami of index
investing that is currently reshaping the mutual fund industry is the result of
a distributed kind of robo advice in which algorithms supplant individual fund
managers.115 There is surely much more to come.
At this point, all such risk assessments can only be conceptual and
speculative. Since robo advice is still not widely adopted in the market, the
current lack of broad-based regulatory capacity seems unlikely to have done

111. Braess’s paradox demonstrates mathematically how the introduction of a new, faster link
between two points can paradoxically reduce the mean driving time, despite the introduction of
new road capacity. See Eric I. Pas & Shari L. Principio, Braess’ Paradox: Some New Insights, 31 TRANSP.
RES. PART B: METHODOLOGICAL 265 (1997) (reviewing literature regarding the paradox).
112. See generally id. (explaining the circumstances under which the paradox holds and how
marginal cost pricing can solve the problem).
113. Cf. Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification,
9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371 (2003) (describing how insurance companies classify policy holders into
risk pools because insurance companies lack complete information about policy holders’
behaviors and risk aversion).
114. See generally Lawrence Harris & Eitan Gurel, Price and Volume Effects Associated with Changes
in the S&P 500 List: New Evidence for the Existence of Price Pressures, 41 J. FIN. 815 (1986)
(demonstrating that the price of a stock rises when it is added to the S&P 500).
115. See Tom Petruno, Small Investors’ Move to ‘Passive’ Stock Funds Becomes a Stampede, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-investing-quarterlyindex-funds-20170409-story.html.
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much harm—yet.116 The time has come for the financial services authorities
to develop the capacity to engage in a more systematic risk assessment.
In that effort, it makes most sense to think of financial services regulation
as following a dynamic regulatory trajectory. The first step is gathering
information to assess what capacities the agencies need to develop, and some
regulators have begun to do just that.117 One useful model for this step is the
market review commonly undertaken by the Financial Conduct Authority
(“FCA”) in the U.K. as an early step in their regulatory process.118 Notably, the
FCA conducted a broad Financial Advice Market Review that produced a final
report in March 2016 that addressed automated financial advice as a potential
solution to the problem of a lack of broad access to financial advice.119 While
that report did not address the kinds of regulatory challenges this Essay has
identified, automated advice was not the central focus of the review. Now that
automated financial advice has received such positive attention, the next
logical step for the FCA and other regulators is to consider the challenges
involved in ensuring that automated advice lives up to its potential.
After the market review and associated assessment of regulatory capacity,
the next step is to develop the necessary regulatory capacities. In this phase,
regulatory authorities will not be starting from ground zero, as the large
financial services organizations that are purchasing robo advice services are
already developing methods for assessing the quality of those services.120 Thus,
the regulatory agencies will simply need to address a “make or buy” decision
about the necessary expertise.
After developing the appropriate regulatory capacities, regulators will be
equipped to formulate a strategy that addresses the challenges involved in
adapting to the scale and consequences of robo advice in the market in a
manner that promotes both effective innovation and honest and competent
robo advising. Over time, financial services regulators will likely take an
increasingly strict approach toward safeguarding the competence and honesty
of robo advisors and the suitability of their advice, but much of this oversight
can be accomplished on an automated basis and, as discussed below, it will

116. Note that, although we are not proposing application of the precautionary principle
here (because the small market share of robo advisors reduces the concerns), we expect that
other commentators may do so. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA.
L. REV. 1003, 1003 (2003) (noting the strength of the precautionary principle “in legal systems
all over the world”).
117. See, e.g., FINRA, supra note 1; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 17; Press Release, N.Y.
State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., supra note 6.
118. See generally FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FINANCIAL ADVICE MARKET REVIEW: FINAL REPORT
(2016) (describing the market review for the year 2016).
119. Id. at 28.
120. See FINRA, supra note 1, at 13 (identifying best practices that assume the availability of
services to evaluate the competence and honesty of digital investment advisors).
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reflect and encourage the current dynamism in the broader financial
technology market.
Of course, these are broad generalizations. However, that is all that is
possible before the financial services authorities engage in the kind of
systematic, interdisciplinary assessment that we advocate in this Essay.
IV.

CONCLUSION: BEYOND BASIC HONESTY, COMPETENCE, AND SUITABILITY

The designers of robo advisor technology and the regulators of robo
advisor technology have a ways to go before robo advisors reach their potential
and deliver high-quality advice to a mass-consumer market across a broad
range of financial services.121 Nevertheless, it is not too early to begin thinking
about what comes next. For that purpose, it is useful to assume that regulators
will develop the capacity to confirm that robo advisors do what their creators
and operators say, based on access to data of adequate quality, and that
regulators will gain the authority to remove from the market robo advisors
who cannot or will not prove their capabilities to regulators.122 That means
that, in the near future, consumers will have access to well-designed robo
advisors that honestly and competently recommend suitable financial
products for consumers across the entire spectrum of financial products,
employing appropriate choice architecture and reliable information
technology infrastructure.
If we assume this basic competence and honesty for the moment, we can
look ahead to other challenges and opportunities. In this concluding Part, we
present one such challenge and two opportunities. The challenge is fostering
a market in which an evolving diversity of robo advisors and consumer
financial product intermediaries compete based on the measurable quality of
their advice and related services for consumers. The opportunities are a leap
forward in the ability to hold consumer financial product intermediaries
accountable and a new approach to consumer financial product regulation
that fosters more diversity in the forms and features of consumer financial
products to better match the heterogeneity of consumers.
The challenge. While some regulatory oversight of the core components of
robo advisors seems necessary to ensure basic competence and honesty, there
is a risk that regulatory oversight will be watered down in the face of pressure

121. See BLACKROCK, supra note 22, at 1 (“While digital advisors represent a very small
segment relative to more traditional financial advice providers, their recent rapid growth suggests
a need for a focused analysis of the business and activities of these advisors.”).
122. See, e.g., MASS. SEC. DIV., POLICY STATEMENT: STATE-REGISTERED INVESTMENT ADVISERS’ USE
OF THIRD-PARTY ROBO-ADVISERS 1, https://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctpdf/Policy-Statement-StateRegistered-Investment-Advisers-Use-of-Third-Party-Robo-Advisers.pdf; MASS. SEC. DIV., supra note 22,
4–6; THE BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REPORT ON THE IOSCO SOCIAL MEDIA AND
AUTOMATION OF ADVICE TOOLS SURVEYS 21–22 (2014), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD445.pdf.
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by powerful financial services enterprises that have thrived in the past.123 In
addition, regulatory oversight poses the risk of discouraging innovation by
serving as a barrier to entry into the market for robo advisors. Moreover, as
regulators develop preferences about robo advisor design, and as regulated
entities come to understand those preferences, oversight may lead to a model
convergence that increases the risk of catastrophic failure.124
To counter these risks, we propose that, in addition to their oversight
activities, regulatory agencies also develop contests of contests, in which the
agencies provide substantial cash prizes to organizations that develop contests
in which robo advisors compete based on measurable differences in the
quality of their components—especially the ranking and matching
algorithms, choice architecture, and data access and efficiency—as well as
their overall performance. A contest of contests promotes diverse, innovative
ways to measure success. That diversity and innovation in measuring success
will promote diversity among and innovation by robo advisors, and because
the contests will themselves change over time, there will be less risk that all
robo advisors will be tuned to any single way of measuring success.
The accountability opportunity. The automated nature of robo advisors
means that robo advice inputs and outputs, algorithms, and much of the
choice architecture exists in digital form, and, thus, can be analyzed using
digital tools. Indeed, it should be possible to store the customer and product
inputs, advice algorithm, choice interface, market conditions, and outcome
for every individual customer interaction and to link all the interactions of the
firm with that customer over time, creating the robo advisor analog to the
“black boxes” proposed for self-driving cars.125
Whether financial services regulators presently have the legal authority
to require firms to retain these data and make them available for analysis is a
domain-specific legal question that lies beyond the scope of our analysis.126
123. See BARR ET AL., supra note 13, at 644–48 (noting objections to adopting the fiduciary
standard for all investment advisors, including traditional stock brokers, on the grounds that
trying to apply that standard to stock brokers will water down the standard rather than improve
consumer protection).
124. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 118, at 26 (noting the concern that robo advisors
may stop innovating if the government becomes too actively involved). The FCA did not make
the point about catastrophic risk. See generally id.
125. See Darrell Etherington, Germany Wants a ‘Black-Box’ in Any Car with Self-Driving Features,
TECHCRUNCH (July 18, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/18/germany-wants-a-blackbox-in-any-car-with-self-driving-features.
126. The transparency complications raised by the use of machine learning algorithms is also
outside the scope of our analysis for two reasons. First, our understanding is that machine
learning algorithms are not presently used by robo advisors to any significant extent. Moreover,
the issues are presently under close investigation in relation to the government’s use of machine
learning algorithms. See, e.g., Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 80, at 1147 (proposing that, although
currently under close government watch, the use of machine learning ought to “pass muster
under core, time-honored doctrines of administrative and constitutional law”). Financial services
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The main point is that these data could lead to a leap forward in our ability to
hold consumer product intermediaries accountable for providing misleading,
incomplete or otherwise inadequate advice. Similar to the black boxes in selfdriving cars, these data would provide a record for analysis if the consumer
has an “accident”—in this context, meaning that the consumer suffers a
financial misfortune related to a consumer financial product—making it
possible to evaluate the role of the intermediary and to determine whether to
hold the intermediary accountable.
The diversity opportunity. From a consumer protection standpoint, the
history of financial services innovation has not been kind to advocates of
complexity and choice. Across all three of the major financial services sectors,
consumer product intermediaries have used complexity and choice to take
advantage of consumers, particularly those who are less sophisticated.127 The
days are gone in which policymakers believe that a minority of well-informed
and careful shoppers—Thaler and Sunstein’s “Econs”—can make a market
fair when that market is structured to exploit fallible humans.128 In response,
consumer protection advocates have called for a return to “plain vanilla”
financial products.129 This is not because they believe that vanilla is best for
everyone, but rather because the evidence shows that choice and complexity

regulators will be able to “piggy back” on the results of those investigations if and when machine
learning algorithms become important in the robo advisor context.
127. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, Even Math Teachers Are at a Loss to Understand Annuities, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/29/your-money/403b-teachersannuities.html; Tara Siegel Bernard, Think Your Retirement Plan Is Bad? Talk to a Teacher, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/your-money/403-b-retirement-plans-feesteachers.html; Tara Siegel Bernard, An Annuity for the Teacher—and the Broker, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/27/your-money/403-b-retirement-plans-teachersbrokers-fees.html; Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 55, at 296, 308.
128. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, “You Want Insurance with That?” Using Behavioral
Economics to Protect Consumers from Add-On Insurance Products, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 37 (2013)
(reviewing prior economic literature and summarizing behavioral economics research
demonstrating that a small number of informed shoppers cannot prevent sellers from taking
advantage of others).
129. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., NEW AM. FOUND., BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED FINANCIAL
SERVICES REGULATION 9–10 (2008), http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=10
28&context=other (suggesting that a plain vanilla set of default mortgages would be easier to compare
across mortgage offers); Elizabeth Warren, Three Myths About the Consumer Financial Product Agency,
BASELINE SCENARIO (July 21, 2009), http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/21/three-myths-aboutthe-consumer-financial-product-agency (noting that the promotion of “plain vanilla” contracts is
CFPA’s real regulatory break-through).
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lead to exploitation and regressive cross subsidies.130 They believe, with some
reason, that vanilla is good enough for most people.131
Once consumers have—and use—easy access to robo advisors, the
analysis could change. A good robo advisor gives an unsophisticated
consumer more processing power than even the most sophisticated consumer
working on her own. That could lead to a fundamental shift in regulatory
strategy: from regulating the content of consumer financial products to
(1) facilitating access to the data needed to make robo advisors work; and
(2) taking appropriate measures to verify the quality of the robo advisors and
the public access to them. This is a disclosure-based regulatory strategy with a
twist: electronic disclosure of product attributes to robo advisors; an easy
procedure for consumers to authorize electronic disclosure to robo advisors
of their own relevant financial or other relevant data; and robo advisor
disclosure of the data needed to verify their competence and honesty to the
appropriate regulatory authority.
***
Our goal in this Essay has been to open a discussion within legal and
financial services scholarship that invites the participation of those with
expertise in other relevant disciplines. In keeping with this goal, we have
raised more questions than we have answered, and we have barely sketched
the outlines of even the best of our ideas. However, that is appropriate at this
stage of the regulatory trajectory.
As robo advisors grow in scale, protecting the integrity of financial
markets will require the kind of cross-disciplinary cooperation that regularly
occurs in the domains of health and environmental regulation. As we
observed at the outset, people design, implement and market robo advisers,
and it cannot simply be assumed that they can or will always act in consumers’
best interests. The lawyers, economists, and behavioral scientists already
involved in financial services regulation will need to understand enough
about computer and data science to craft and apply new regulatory strategies,
and the computer and data scientists at the forefront of the innovation will
need to understand enough about legal structures and ways of thinking to
help make the new regulatory strategies sensible. The benefits from these
efforts almost certainly will exceed the costs, because the very same returns to
scale that make robo advisors so cost-effective lead to similar returns to scale
in assessing their quality. Coordinating that effort is a logical and important

130. MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV., BEHAVIORALLY
INFORMED HOME MORTGAGE CREDIT REGULATION 19–20 (2008), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/
sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/ucc08-12_barr_mullainathan_shafir.pdf (noting that the market in some
cases would like to exploit or exaggerate consumer fallibility).
131. Warren, supra note 129 (noting that “plain vanilla” contracts would meet the needs of
about 95% of customers).
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role for our expert financial services regulators. It is time for them to develop
the necessary expertise.

